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BANISHING THE THIRTEENTH JUROR: AN
APPROACH TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF
PROSECUTORIAL RACISM
INTRODUCTION

With their client's execution imminent, defense lawyers for James
Russell worked feverishly on briefs for submission to the Texas courts,
to the lower federal courts, and ultimately to the United States
Supreme Court. They alleged, inter alia, that the county prosecutor in
Russell's capital murder trial had injected the issue ofrace into the proceedings. "Can you imagine the fear that [the victim] went through,"
he had asked the all-white jury, "out with three blacks[?]" 1 Later, he
had urged: "Ladies and gentlemen, we have been concerning ourselves with the civil rights of the Defendant for the past 20 years. I
think it's time we started thinking about the civil rights of the victims. " 2
The comments from Russell's trial exemplify two different types of
remarks challenged in courts during this century, the explicit and implicit references to color. The "three blacks" comment invoked race at
best neutrally, at worst, to embroil the all-white jury in prejudice. The
"civil rights" comment, though facially innocuous, allegedly evoked racial frustrations in the jury. The state denied that either remark was a
racial slur, disavowing any association at all between the "civil rights"
comment and the defendant's race. 3
Without setting forth a standard for defining racism in the context
of prosecutorial forensics, no court that heard Russell's case agreed
l. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Russell v. Collins, 944 F.2d 202 (5th Cir.)
(No. 10,650), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 30 (1991) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Petition].
2. Id. at 17. The state prosecutor also asked a black witness: "Well, you said James
Russell said that he made a 'bitch' out of the man before he killed him. Does that have any
meaning to you people?" Applicant's Reply to State's Original Answer & Brief at 12,
Russell v. Collins, 944 F.2d 202 (5th Cir.) (No. 10,650), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 30
(1991) (emphasis added) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Applicant's Reply].
3. See Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 9(6) and, Alternatively,
Answer, Motion for Summary Judgment at 18, Russell v. Collins, 944 F.2d 202 (5th Cir.)
(No. 10,650), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 30 (1991) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Defense counsel in their petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
argued:
"Civil rights" popularly connotes the rights that Black Americans won in the
1950s through the present. E.g., "Civil Rights Movement," "Civil Rights Act."
Conversely, "civil liberties," which is the term describing what the district court
judge refers to, means other liberties afforded by the Supreme Court, including
criminal rights. E.g., "American Civil Liberties Union."
Petition, supra note 1, at 32 n.34. It bears mention that twenty years previously, the
defendant had been in school, not prison.
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with the arguments made by defense counsel. 4 The courts saw the
comments as isolated blemishes on an otherwise strong case for the
prosecution. 5 Although the Fifth Circuit deemed one comment "regrettable" in a footnote, the court gave it very cursory attention, by no
means establishing it or the other comments as potentially prejudicial
forays into prosecutorial racism. 6 Because the comments were classic
"harmless error," courts left the conviction and penalty intact. On September 19, 1991,James Russell was executed by lethal injection.
The prohibition against the interposition of racism into a trial both
antedates and survives Russell's story. Its roots lie in the Equal Protection Clause and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury,
extended to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. Official guidelines for prosecutors speak often and decisively
against racist appeals. With doctrinal roots in the Constitution and
professional ethics, the rule against prosecutorial summoning of "that
thirteenth juror, prejudice" 7 has surfaced in nearly every jurisdiction
and has occasioned numerous reversals. 8
Although the prohibition's directive may be clear, courts have
struggled to formulate an analytical framework well-suited to address
the problem. Distinguishing between racial references that serve an
important and probative function and those that are unduly prejudicial
to the defendant poses serious difficulties for trial and appellate courts.
Courts grapple with the identification of more subtle racism, which by
most accounts has proliferated in modern American society. In an inquiry driven by concern for jury impartiality, courts try to devise a
means of gauging the effect of a racial reference on the jury. The effort
to do so may send courts into the realm of speculation.
Stripped to its basics, the ban against prosecutorial racism requires
two steps for its implementation, one focusing on ascertaining that a
violation has occurred, the other addressing its remedy by harmless error analysis or fundamental error analysis. 9 While the violation and
4. Neither the district court in Russell v. Collins, Civ. H-91-2751 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
18, 1991) nor the circuit court in Russell, 944 F.2d 202, accepted the defense counsel's
arguments. Justice Marshall was the lone dissenter to the denial of certiorari. See 112
S. Ct. at 30.
5. See Russell, 944 F.2d at 204 n. l.
6. See id.
7. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 659 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
8. For a comprehensive survey of cases, see Debra T. Landis, Annotation,
Prosecutor's Appeals in Criminal Case to Racial, National, or Religious Prejudice as
Ground for Mistrial, New Trial, Reversal, or Vacation of Sentence-Modern Cases, 70
A.LR.4th 664 (1991).
9. First, a court must deem a comment or the entire substance of an argument
either directly or indirectly susceptible to racist interpretation. Second, a court applies
either harmless or fundamental error analysis in determining whether and to what
extent a remedy should be accorded. Some courts have analogized prosecutorial racism
to judicial partiality, denial of counsel or coerced self-incrimination, exceptions to
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remedy inqmnes seem distinct, they have often been conflated. In
James Russell's case, for example, the Fifth Circuit relied on the weight
of extraneous evidence against the defendant, a relevant factor in
harmless error analysis, in determining the racial significance of the
prosecutor's argument. 10 The existence of a meaningful remedy, then,
appeared to influence the determination of whether a racist remark had
ever been uttered.
This Note argues that a violation of the rule proscribing
prosecutorial racism 11 must be identified even when no remedy exists.12 Although identifying a violation of the rule against prosecutorial
racism may seem a minor victory, because many courts employing
harmless error analysis will not reverse the conviction, detection serves
an important function in reinforcing values inherent in the American
judicial system. When courts let racism go unnoticed, they influence
society by example and perpetuate injustice. 13 Moreover, even when
the particular defendant is in fact guilty, failing to recognize racism erodes the safeguard of a fair trial and presents increased danger to innocent defendants in future cases. 14
To avert these evils, the identification of situations in which prosecutors may compromise jury impartiality must have a serious and
prominent position within the reviewing court's opinion. This Note
contends that too many courts appear to have let concerns about unwarranted reversals and attendant costs influence their discussions
Chapman v. California all considered harmful per se and thus mandating automatic
reversal. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967). Other courts have
refused to extend the Chapman exceptions and thus have used harmless error analysis.
In these jurisdictions, a racist comment will not be grounds for reversal if enough
evidence exists to convict the defendant without the impermissible epithet or argument.
See generally Steven D. DeBrota, Note, Arguments Appealing to Racial Prejudice:
Uncertainty, Impartiality, and the Harmless Error Doctrine, 64 Ind. LJ. 375 (1989)
(arguing that racially prejudiced appeals to the jury should fit within the exceptions to
Chapman, thus mandating automatic reversal).
10. See Russell, 944 F.2d at 204 n. l. Although the court barred most of Russell's
claims because of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus, it nevertheless explicitly delved
into the merits of the racial issue. See id. at 206. The court found the remark
concerning the race of Russell and his codefendants to be "regrettable," though "only
an isolated reference to the race of the defendant and his accomplices in an argument
that touched upon many, many points." Id. at 204 n.l.
11. "Prosecutorial racism" will be used in this Note as a shorthand for arguments,
unconscious or intentional, that pose the danger of evoking impermissible and
irrelevant racial considerations in the minds of jurors.
12. This Note does not focus on the remedy inquiry and takes no position on what
magnitude of violation justifies a mistrial or reversal. However, it should be pointed out
that the expansive definition of improper remarks offered in this Note will doubtlessly
counsel against an automatic reversal rule in many situations.
13. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 325 (1987).
14. See Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the
Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 946, 947 (1954) [hereinafter Note,
Forensic Misconduct].
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about potentially inflammatory comments. Occasionally deeming a
comment "regrettable" or "improper," this Note argues, will never be
enough. Rather, courts must give serious and consistent credence to
charges of racism and recognize the many instances in a trial in which
subtle arguments may prey on unconscious fears and resentments of
the jury.
This Note formulates an approach to identifying violations of the
rule against prosecutorial racism. 15 Part One examines the constitutional and prudential foundations of the rule in order to ascertain its
purpose, concluding that the proscription is best understood as a safeguard against jury bias rather than as a deterrent against prosecutorial
misconduct. Part Two sets forth particular problems of enforcement
and analyzes the line of cases construing the rule in view of its perceived purpose. This Part demonstrates that the rule has engendered a
variety of tests, each of which presents its own analytical difficulties.
Part Three suggests a two-pronged test that recognizes that the ends of
justice would be furthered if explicit references to race were presumptively prejudicial unless offered for a specific and relevant purpose, and
argues that indirect references should be evaluated first according to an
objective, reasonable person standard.
I.

PURPOSES OF THE PROHIBITION

An understanding of the constitutional and prudential factors underlying the prohibition of prosecutorial racism is critical to defining
racism in this context. 16 Although the ban primarily serves to protect
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the defendant, courts
frequently seem to rely on it in order to demarcate the proper boundaries of prosecutorial discretion. The rule thus appears to have dual emphases: it protects the defendant's rights and acts as an instrument for
curtailing untoward prosecutorial conduct.
That the rule has two rationales may account for the inconsistency
of standards employed in various jurisdictions for determining the racial tenor of a comment. To restrain the prosecutor, some courts have
created a deterrent that addresses intentional or grossly negligent conduct. 17 Subjectively good faith conduct by the prosecutor, however,
15. Although most cases cited in this Note pertain to racial bias, the analysis of
ethnicity-based attacks is indistinguishable in principle.
16. While individual state constitutions may provide additional protection against
prosecutorial racism, this Note focuses on the protections provided by the U.S.
Constitution.
17. Deterrence is premised on the idea that awareness of impropriety and the risk
of punishment will create incentives for actors not to engage in the sanctioned conduct.
Because people cannot modify what they do unconsciously, deterrence necessarily
focuses on those aspects of conduct or those kinds of conduct that are within the actor's
control. In the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule context, in which the Supreme
Court's articulated rationale has been deterrence at least since United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974), the Court found that [t]he deterrent purpose ...
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can equally impinge on the defendant's right to an impartialjury. Emphasis solely on bridling the prosecutor therefore elides aspects of the
constitutional violation.
This section sets forth the sources of the rule and argues that despite their different emphases, the two antecedents have consistent
goals. The prosecutorial boundary-setting standard represents one
means among many of achieving the larger objective reflected in the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments: creating a criminal justice system
in which racist considerations play no part.
A. Substantive Basis of the Rule: Guarding the Constitutional Rights of the
Defendant

The Bill of Rights embodies a commitment to maintaining certain
procedural safeguards in our criminal justice system. 18 In addition to
providing security against excessive government intrusiveness during
the investigatory phase of a criminal action, 19 the amendments ensure
that the defendant is accorded due process of law, 20 privileged against
compulsory self-incrimination, 21 shielded from double jeopardy 22 and
cruel and unusual punishment, 23 and guaranteed an impartial jury. 24
The perpetuation of these rights suggests two values underlying the
American criminal justice system: the beliefs that fairness and impartial
adjudication must be accorded all defendants, and that boundaries to
legitimate law enforcement must always be maintained and respected. 25
The notion that the people's representative in a criminal trial
should not seek to convict a defendant by resorting to racist arguments
before the jury is implicit in both of these core values. By appealing to
racism, the prosecutor implies that a given immutable characteristic
makes this defendant more worthy of incarceration and the moral opprobrium of criminal conviction. The prosecutor, in soliciting a judgment based on status, thus goes beyond the evidence and the relevant
issue of the defendant's conduct.
necessarily assumes that the police have been engaged in willful, or at the very least
negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right . . . . Where the
official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale
loses much of its force. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
18. Indeed, four of the eight amendments of the Bill of Rights that concern
particular individual rights-the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th-directly implicate criminal
procedure. These amendments demonstrate the kind of substantive individual rights
that the Framers deemed essential for protection.
19. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
20. U.S. Const. amend V.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
24. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
25. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("It is as much [the
prosecutor's] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.").
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The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of "an impartial jury" mandates jury indifference to irrelevant, immutable characteristics "regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt of the
offender or the station in life which he occupies." 26 Activity by the
state at the onset of the trial designed to assemble a body of biased
jurors clearly violates this constitutional right. Addressing this problem, the Supreme Court has held that the jury must be selected from a
representative cross section of the community, 27 that a defendant's
counsel must have fair opportunity to screen potential jurors, 28 and
that defense counsel in a capital murder trial may inquire in voir dire
about prospective jurors' racial views.2 9
A prosecutor's injection of racism into a criminal trial is similar in
gravity to these other violations of the Sixth Amendment. 30 Because
"the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government, " 31 racist arguments by the prosecutor may adversely affect jury
impartiality even more concretely than when jurors are selected impermissibly on account of their race. 32 Recognizing the fundamental nature of the impartial jury guarantee, the Supreme Court in 1968
applied the Sixth Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 33 All jurisdictions currently protect the de26. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). As the Court has remarked,
Because of the risk that the factor of race may enter the criminal justice process,
we have engaged in "unceasing efforts" to eradicate racial prejudice from our
criminal justice system. Our efforts have been guided by our recognition that
"the inestimable privilege, of trial by jury ... is a vital principle, underlying the
whole administration of criminal justice." Thus, it is the jury that is a criminal
defendant's fundamental "protection of life and liberty against race or color
prejudice."
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1987) (citations omitted).
27. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (gender distribution); Peters
v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (race distribution).
28. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976). The court was careful to
circumscribe the scope of this opportunity to question, refusing to grant a right to
question individuals for specific racial prejudice in every interracial situation. See id. at
597-98.
29. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986).
30. The Supreme Court recognized this, albeit in dictum in a footnote, in a case
that did not involve racist comments by the prosecutor. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309
n.30 ("The Constitution prohibits racially-biased prosecutorial arguments."). As noted,
by refusing to grant certiorari, the Court did not address the issue in James Russell's
case. See Russell v. Collins, 112 S. Ct. 30 (1991).
31. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18 (1985).
32. See United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Actual racist
arguments may cause more damage than some other constitutional violations because
restrictions on jury selection may be premised on the rights of prospective jurors, see
Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is
It, Anyway?, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 725 ( 1992), or on the merely statistical likelihood that an
all-white jury cannot be impartial.
33. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).
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fendant against the unconstitutional interposition of racial prejudice at
trial.
The Sixth Amendment's textual mooring for the rule against
prosecutorial racism is strengthened in the state sphere by the Equal
Protection Clause. 34 The very essence of the Equal Protection Clause
is that the system must treat white and black defendants charged with
identical crimes precisely in the same manner. 35 Racist forensics in
criminal trials offend an animating purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, that certain racial considerations be banished from criminal
proceedings. 36
The constitutional inquiry, framed as a safeguard againstjury bias,
dictates a result-oriented <lPproach to defining racism. 37 The critical
question for analysis of constitutional violations is whether a prosecutor's conduct or activities has had a detrimental effect on the defendant's right to an impartial jury or to equal protection. The due process
or equal protection violation 38 may occur whether the argument was
deliberate or unintentional, 39 whether the defendant is conclusively
guilty or arguably innocent.

B. Prudential Underpinnings: Reining in the Prosecutor
While the substantive constitutional basis of the proscription
against prosecutorial racism focuses on the defendant's rights, the second antecedent is more utilitarian: it emphasizes the need to define
external restraints on the prosecutor. A racist appeal to the jury represents a prosecutorial foray into the realm of "foul blows," which the
system tries to deter. 40 As in any effort at deterrence, this rationale
focuses primarily on blameworthy conduct. 41
In part, the need for restrictions on prosecutorial conduct arises
34. See Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978); United States
ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1973).
35. See Haynes, 481 F.2d at 158 (citing Sen. Thaddeus Stevens, l Statutory History
of the United States Civil Rights 222-23 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970)).
36. See Miller, 583 F.2d at 707; see also Haynes, 481 F.2d at 159 ("[I]njection
against a black man of race prejudice" is "antithetical to the purposes of the fourteenth
amendment.").
37. See Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and
Due Process: There's More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 Colum. L. Rev.
1298 (1988).
38. Choosing between the two is not necessary. As the Second Circuit observed in
Haynes, prosecutorial racism marks "the point where the due process and equal
protection clauses overlap or at least meet." 481 F.2d at 159. This analysis will focus
primarily on Sixth Amendment and due process violations, because they are cited more
frequently by courts.
39. As the court noted in United States v. Netti, "it hurts the defendant just as
much to have the prejudicial blasts come from the trumpet of Gabriel." 12 l F.2d 927,
930 (3d Cir. 194 l).
40. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
41. See supra note 17.
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because the prosecutor must play two distinct roles. The prosecutor
serves as the representative of the people and, insofar as the defendant
is one of the people, as a representative of the defendant. 42 As such,
the prosecutor must simultaneously be an agent of strict compliance
with state law and a quasi-judicial officer seeking justice. 43 Ideally, the
prosecutor thus possesses the capability and motivation "to operate
with one hand on the throttle and the other hand poised firmly on the
brake." 44
Institutional and political pressures combine to create tremendous
incentives for the prosecutor to overlook her quasi-judicial obligation.
From an institutional perspective, the adversary system itself can endow
a prosecutor with a "conviction psychology" 45 and thus make her more
prone to engage in "zeal at the margins." 46 The prosecutor not only
spends considerable time with victims and witnesses, most of whom
suggest the defendant's guilt rather than innocence; she also tends to
perceive procedural advantages accorded the defendant as sending the
prosecution "into battle with a blunted sword." 47 On the political side,
public clamor, a desire for publicity, and career ambition all may influence the prosecutor to place considerations of justice in the backseat. 48
Several codes of conduct and bar association standards have
emerged to combat the incentives for prosecutors to disregard fairness.
These rules admonish prosecutors to respect justice over their conviction records, 49 to eschew undignified or discourteous conduct, 50 and to
forbear from arguments designed to inflame the prejudices of the
jury. 51 Although the standards vary in their specificity, all operate to
define the outer parameters of acceptable prosecutorial behavior.
While the rules establish proscribed areas of conduct, they have
proven ineffective as real restraints. 52 As one commentator observed,
42. See Henry Blaine Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the
Prosecutor's Closing Argument, 64 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 22, 22 (1973).
43. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 197, 198 ( 1988).
44. Vess, supra note 42, at 22.
45. Fisher, supra note 43, at 205.
46. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in The Good Lawyer 83, 89
(1983).
4 7. Fisher, supra note 43, at 211.
48. See J. Lynda! Hagemeyer, Note, Statements by Prosecuting Attorneys to Juries
Which Demand Improper Considerations for Verdict or Punishment, 39 Va. L. Rev. 85,
86 (1953).
49. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 5 (1980).
50. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-36 (1989).
51. See Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-5.8(c) (2d ed. 1980).
52. See Fisher, supra note 43, at 212 ("With few exceptions, the rules and
standards are framed so broadly that they offer prosecutors little concrete guidance.");
Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1365, 1365 (1987) ("[F]ew operate in a vacuum so devoid of externally
enforceable constraints."); Richard G. Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal
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in the "[l]iterally hundreds of truly egregious instances of prosecutorial
misconduct" he had analyzed in preparing his book, "none ... resulted
in punishment of the prosecutor by his superiors ... or bar associations. "53 The dearth of professional discipline of prosecutors has led
many commentators to propose a more active role for courts in tempering prosecutorial polemics. 54
The judicial attempt to set boundaries suffers from similar enforcement problems. To deter prosecutorial racism, courts may issue contempt sanctions, declare mistrials, or reverse convictions. The
contempt option has been diminished by a nearly invariable unwillingness among courts to impose sanctions on the prosecutor for even the
most egregious examples of misconduct. 55 Only through the granting
of reversals and mistrials, then, is racist conduct by the prosecutor ever
redressed. 56

C. Synthesis: Ascertaining the Purpose of the Prohibition
The existence of both a constitutional basis and prudential sources
of the rule against prosecutorial racism in criminal trials has generated
confusion as to the most suitable means of identifying racism. Any attempt to formulate a deterrent against prosecutorial misconduct must focus on culpable conduct. 57 When reviewing courts view this objective
Prosecutors-and How it Grew, 20 Ala. L. Rev. 227, 229 (1968) (arguing for greater
safeguards because current standards are too weak).
53. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct, 13-2 n.4 (6th ed. 1991); see
also Greg Rushford, Watching the Watchdog, Legal Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at 1
(suggesting the absence of accountable control mechanisms for prosecutorial abuse).
54. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 53, at 13-1-13-2 (arguing that nonjudicial
sanctions are ineffective); Harry Caldwell, Name Calling at Trial: Placing Parameters on
the Prosecutor, 8 Am. ]. Trial Advoc. 385, 394-95 (1985) (discussing availability of
contempt citations for flagrant misconduct); Singer, supra note 52, at 276 (arguing for
contempt citations as a means of curtailing misconduct); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical
Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965 (1984).
55. A 1991 study by Gershman found six cases nationwide in which the prosecutor
had been held in contempt, one of which was subsequently reversed on appeal.
Gershman, supra note 53, at 13-13 n.69. Singer, in his 1968 search, lamented that he
was "unable to find one case where, regardless of the clarity of intent to misbehave, the
sanction of contempt [was] used against a federal prosecutor." Singer, supra note 52, at
276.
56. As some commentators have noted, if deterrence is the primary goal of a
restriction on prosecutorial forensics, reversal may not be the best way to achieve it. See
Gershman, supra note 53, at 13-3; Singer, supra note 52, at 272-74. But see Albert W.
Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 629,
646-47 (1972) (arguing that reversals may influence prosecutor's superiors and that
media coverage may tarnish prosecutor's reputation). Judge Hand expressed his
concern about the deterrent effect of reversal succinctly: "That was plainly an improper
remark, and if a reversal would do no more than show our disapproval, we might
reverse. Unhappily, it would accomplish little towards punishing the offender, and
would upset the conviction ofa plainly guilty man." United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d
35, 3 7 (2d Cir. 1939).
57. See supra note 17.
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as the primary concern, the emphasis shifts from the impartiality of the
jury, the most relevant factor in the constitutional analysis, to the mindset of the prosecutor.
Although they address different elements of the problem, however,
the constitutional and deterrence inquiries are not as disparate as they
appear. The principal duty of a prosecutor according to the professional guidelines is not to convict but rather to pursue justice. 58 The
central concern of professional standards, which provide a basis for the
boundary-setting rationale, thus lies in fairness.
Deterrence in this context represents a means to an end rather
than an end in itself. Viewed in this light, the focus on the prosecutor's
conduct emanating from professional standards can be seen merely as
one effort to achieve the ends prescribed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Cases directed at deterring the prosecutor constitute an
affirmation of the idea that the government, for good or bad, sets forth
an example for the people. 59 By attempting to curtail prosecutorial exploitation of the jury's racism, a deterrence analysis focuses on purging
the trial of conscious official complicity in biased decision-making. Because it refers to prosecutorial conduct rather than jury reaction, however, deterrence represents an incomplete strategy. Deterrence efforts
must be seen as an important though not exclusive aspect of a ban on
prosecutorial racism.
II.

THE PROHIBITION IN PRACTICE

Although judicial approaches to the rule against racist appeals to
the jury vary by case and by jurisdiction, 60 all courts face similar difficulties in devising tests to identify racism. Problems arise in determining when a racial reference oversteps the bounds of legality, in
detecting subtle racism, and in measuring the effect of a comment on
the jury.
The court evaluating a claim of prosecutorial racism faces an
unenviable task. While acknowledging that the evil of racism must be
combatted on every front, courts appear to enter their inquiry mindful
of the Supreme Court's admonition from another century:
If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were
grounds for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would
stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of
trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried away by this temptation. 61
Many references to race defy classification as racist. To maintain the
integrity of the judicial system, courts are charged with the often baf58. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 5 ( 1990).
59. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,
dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
60. See infra notes 79-128 and accompanying text.
61. Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897).

J.,
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fling job of drawing a line between permissible and impermissible references to skin color.
To a degree, judicial approaches to this task coincide with those
that a lay observer might adopt. The court in State v. Davidson 62 held
that the prosecutor's reference to racially offensive statements made by
the defendant did not constitute racism. Substantial evidence existed
in the record that the defendant had had a racist motive for committing
the crime. Defense counsel himself had referred to the defendant's
comments prior to the prosecutor's argument, in an apparent effort to
soften their offensive impact. While noting that comments about race
generally have no place in the courtroom, the court found their admission there relevant and highly probative based on the facts of the particular case. 63
By contrast, in the infamous "Hurricane Carter" case, Carter v.
Rafferty, 64 the district court rejected a similar prosecutorial argument
that the defendant had a racist motive. While the court acknowledged
that racial revenge could be a motive for murder, it found that because
of the dearth of evidence to support the theory, the prosecutor's argument amounted to no more than the contention that guilt should "be
understood and explained solely because [Carter is] black and the victims are white." 65
The distinction between the Davidson and Carter cases is obvious.
When a prosecutorial reference to race has its basis in other evidence, it
may serve a valuable role in the criminal justice system. When it appeals to passion and prejudice rather than facts and law, it compromises the fundamental guarantees of equal protection and an
impartial trial. 66 The problem for courts lies not in recognizing this
distinction, but in determining into which category a racial reference
falls.
The subtle manifestations of modern racism compound this predicament. As American society has matured, blatant forms of racism
have increasingly been replaced by newer, more elusive, but equally
injurious forms of derision. 67 As one commentator notes, "modern
prejudice is subtle, [and] modern forms of racial discrimination are typically indirect and ostensibly nonracial." 68 Although Americans have
62. 541 A.2d 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
63. See id. at 707.
64. 621 F. Supp. 533 (D.NJ. 1985). Folk rock artist Bob Dylan even memorialized
the case in a song. See Bob Dylan, Hurricane, on Desire (Columbia Records 1975).
65. Carter, 621 F.Supp. at 54 l.
66. See id. at 544.
67. See Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psychohistory 32 (1984); Thomas F.
Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 Rutgers
L. Rev. 673 (1985); Reynolds Farley, Trends in Racial Inequalities: Have the Gains of
the 1960s Disappeared in the 1970s?, 42 Am. Soc. Rev. 189, 206 (1977).
68. Pettigrew, supra note 67, at 694; see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in
American and South African Courts: Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
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purportedly learned lessons from the Civil Rights Movement, 69 the net
result appears to be that American culture has rejected outright racism
while perpetuating a "hidden prejudice." 70
To the difficulty of categorizing a racial reference thus is added a
more fundamental problem: often a racial comment sports sheep's
clothing. Confronted with statements like "[the black defendant] logically had access to crack cocaine," 71 and "[b]urn, baby, burn," 72 courts
have faced the initial inquiry of evaluating comments not for their evidentiary support, but for their connection to race at all.
Because the proscription of prosecutorial racism aims primarily at
securing the defendant's right to an impartial jury, 73 courts also endeavor to assess the effects of a racial comment on jury objectivity. 74
The effort to do so suffers from tremendous imprecision, because as
has long been recognized,
[b ]ias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind
that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize
its existence, and it might exist in the mind of one ... who was
quite positive that he had no bias, and said that he was perfectly able to decide the question wholly uninfluenced by anything but the evidence.7 5
In Vasquez v. Hillery, 76 the Supreme Court recognized these difficulties
in determining the effect of racism on the grand jury selection process.
The Court reasoned that when the impartiality of a body responsible
for bringing the defendant to judgment is in question, a reviewing
court cannot evaluate the resulting harm. 1 7
Despite the profusion of obstacles to principled review of
prosecutorial racism, courts have developed several ways of identifying
racist remarks. These approaches can be broken down into three general categories: 78 an intent-based inquiry, in which a comment is racist
479, 545-51 (1990) (examining courtroom racism in context of racism pervading
collective unconscious of society at large).
69. See Pettigrew, supra note 67, at 674.
70. Lawrence, supra note 13, at 335. In the aftermath of the acquittal of the police
officers accused of beating Rodney King, and the ensuing riots all across the nation, it
should not surprise anyone that racial unrest has survived quite intact in America.
71. State v. Henderson, No. 89 CA 96, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5183, at *8 (Ct.
App. Nov. 19, 1990).
72. United States v. Haynes, 466 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1972).
73. This analysis presumes that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments overlap or
meet in this realm. See supra note 38.
74. For a piece suggesting that this task can never be performed adequately, see
DeBrota, supra note 9, at 378-83.
75. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909).
76. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
77. See id. at 263.
78. A fourth category, in which reviewing courts decline to discuss the racist tenor
of a comment at all because defense counsel failed to interpose a contemporaneous
objection, will not be discussed at length because these courts make no effort to
ascertain the existence of a violation. See, e.g., Binns v. State, 364 S.E.2d 871, 872 (Ga.
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only if the prosecutor intended such connotation; a weight-of-evidence
inquiry, in which a comment is racist if little other evidence exists to
convict the defendant; and a relevance-based inquiry, in which references to race with insignificant probative value are considered impermissibly racist.

A. The Intent-Based Inquiry
Under the intent approach, the prosecutor's motivation, or lack
thereof, determines the racial tenor of a comment. Courts that scrutinize prosecutorial intent in order to determine racist content may implicitly rely on the idea that conscious efforts to induce consideration of
improper factors are more likely to work harm to the defendant than
thoughtless misstatements. 79 In the absence of evidence that the prosecutor designed the argument to appeal to jury prejudice, courts applying this standard refuse to label the challenged comment racist. 80
1988) (finding issue of racist remarks precluded); Sanders v. State, 428 N.E.2d 23, 28
(Ind. 1981) (same).
This approach, deemed "procedural default," rests on Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52 and its analogues in every state, which divide error into two categories,
"harmless" and "plain." See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52. When a prosecutor commits a
harmless error, defense counsel must make a timely objection immediately or forfeit all
prospects for appellate review. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 238-39 (1940).
Plain errors, defined by the rule as those "affecting substantial rights," often
encompass errors of constitutional magnitude. See Mark S. Rhodes, 6 Orfield's
Criminal Procedure under the Federal Rules 361 (2d ed. 1987). As a rule, courts seem
to deem harmless the more subtle appeals to race. But see Blakely v. State, 344 So. 2d
812, 817 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) (subtle reference "becomes more clearly impermissible
and prejudicial, the more it is considered").
The procedural default rule relies in principle on the efficacy of the curative
instruction in correcting deviations from impartiality. Commentators have criticized this
reliance. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 52, at 261. The necessity of objecting and the
judge's ensuing instruction may also serve to reinforce the violation in the minds of
jurors. See United States v. Sawyer, 347 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1965). Judge Frank
likened this phenomenon to "the story, by Mark Twain, of the boy told to stand in the
corner and not think of a white elephant." United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155
F.2d 631, 656 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank,]., dissenting).
Insofar as race-baiting by the prosecutor impinges on the defendant's right to a fair
trial, to deem a prejudicial remark "harmless error" for purposes of the procedural
default rule seems misguided.
79. See Note, Forensic Misconduct, supra note 14, at 975. Intent analysis is also
employed by courts to evaluate other kinds of prosecutorial misconduct. Courts delve
into prosecutorial intent in the following contexts: selective prosecution; prosecutorial
vindictiveness in bringing charges; misuse of the grand jury; the duty to provide the
defense with exculpatory evidence; discriminatory use of peremptory challenges; and
the double jeopardy bar to retrying the defendant. See Reiss, supra note 52, at 1366.
80. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 419 So. 2d 634, 636 (Fla. 1982) (no intent led to a
finding of no racism); People v. Abrams, 441 N.E.2d 352, 358-59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(comments made at trial were not deliberate appeals to prejudice). For a case deeming a
comment racist because the court found it intentional, see Withers v. United States, 602
F.2d 124, 126 (6th Cir. 1979).
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The attempt to divine prosecutorial intent leaves considerable
room for judicial speculation. To an extent, courts have determined
the willfulness of racial remarks on an ad hoc basis, without reference
to extraneous or explicit standards. Many courts have effectively asserted, "we do not think that that was racism." 81 The inescapable conclusion is that these courts have relied on their intuitive grasp of
boundaries between the conscious and the unconscious, deeming racist
only the comments they think must have been intentional. 82
Despite the room for judicial latitude, courts adhering to the intent
approach are less likely to conclude that a comment was racially motivated in certain recurring situations. For instance, when the jury consists of white and black members, some courts refuse to make any
inference of intent to inflame jury prejudice. 83 One court found no
intentional appeal to racism because the government's case rested on
the testimony of witnesses of the same race as the defendant. 84 Several
courts found no racist intent when the prosecutor made repeated reference to the races of the defendant and the victim, because the prosecutor did not tell the jury anything they could not readily observe. 85
Finally, in one case, a prosecutor's post-objection apology to the jury
for his remarks was sufficient to convince the court that the remarks had
not been intentionally racist. 86
Intent-based analysis equips a court to identify and afford a remedy
81. See, e.g., Thomas, 419 So. 2d at 636 ("We agree that the prosecutor's question
was not designed to play on racial prejudice .... "); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 361
N.E.2d 212, 219 (Mass. 1977) ("There was no intention, we think, to try to inflame the
jurors with racial prejudice.").
82. This reliance on intuition in itself could be seen as problematic, since judges,
most of whom are white, may have trouble grasping the subtle content of racial remarks.
See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Abrams, 441 N.E.2d at 358-59 (court found remarks must have been
unintended because jury was racially integrated).
84. See United States v. Pena, 793 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1986).
85. See State v. Sheard, 276 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Mo. 1955). In State v. Mayhue, 653
S.W.2d 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), the court found no intentional invocation ofrace in the
prosecutor's reference to "three black men getting on her naked body, dumping their
seed," because the defendant's race and the existence of spermatozoa on the victim
were obvious from the record. Id. at 237.
86. See People v. Rideaux, 393 P.2d 703, 704-05 (Cal. 1964). Courts that do not
place so much emphasis on prosecutorial intent evince a different approach to these
kinds of"apologies." See Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533 (D.N.J. 1985), in which
the court deemed prejudicial the following argument
None of us like to admit that things like race prejudice and anger and hate for
people because of the different color of their skin exists [sic] in this world. We
avoid it. We teach our children the contrary. We support civil rights .... We
wanted a jury which is free from racial prejudice. But, we recognized ... that
not everybody is free from racial prejudice and, of course, we know that no
group, no class is immune from hate and we know that revenge is one of the
most powerful motives that any human being can have.
Id. at 539-40 (emphasis omitted).
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for comments that are flagrant. 87 Thus, when a prosecutor argued that
"[n]ot one white witness has been produced in this case that contradicts
[the black defendant]'s position," 88 the court found an impermissible
appeal to racism. Similarly, a court declared a mistrial when the prosecutor of a Lebanese defendant urged that he was "no different than the
people who hung [sic] Colonel Higgins last week." 89 By contrast, less
flagrant references to race generally have not been found racist. Discerning no deliberate appeal, courts have deemed such comments
neutral. 90
Proponents of the intent-based approach to racism argue that it
can be applied fairly and consistently and that it provides the only
workable standard. 91 If deterrence represented the sole rationale for
proscribing prosecutorial racism, then this argument would carry great
logical force. Moreover, because the prosecutor's record may suffer
from a reversal, "penalizing" the prosecutor only for purposeful comments coincides with a conception of just deserts.
Yet because the focus of any analysis of racism must be on the defendant's constitutional rights, not merely on setting boundaries for
prosecutorial discretion, these arguments in support of an intent-based
87. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 22 So. 2d 519, 520 (Ala. 1945) ("[Y]ou should
consider the fact that [victim] is a young white woman and that this defendant is a black
man for the purpose ... of determining his intent .... ");Weems v. State, 182 So. 3, 4
(Ala. 1938) ("How would you like to have your daughter on that train with nine negroes
in a car?"); Harris v. State, 46 So. 2d 91, 93 (Miss. 1950) (prosecutor referred to
defendant as "a big, black gorilla with arms as long as your legs").
The fact that these cases are older may manifest a shift in views of propriety. The
days of such unabashed courtroom racism may be passing, and the cases most amenable
to intent-based analysis may go with them. More subtle racism, however, persists in the
courtroom and society at large. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
88. Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124, 124-25 (6th Cir. 1979). Immediately
after making this comment, the prosecutor argued that he was not trying to inject race
into the trial. See id. at 126. The reviewing court found that the nature of the
comments strongly disputed the prosecutor's assertion of the comment's inadvertence.
As the court found, the prosecutor "clearly had race on his mind and wanted the jury to
think about what he said." Id. See also People v. Burris, 241 N.Y.S.2d 75 (App. Div.
1963) (prosecutor urged jury to weigh identification testimony in light of the fact that
both witness and defendant were black).
89. See Judge Voids Sanity Phase of Naddi Murder Trial, L.A. Times, Aug. IO,
1989, pt. 2, at 3. The reference was to the murder by Arab terrorists of an American
hostage in the Middle East. The prosecutor claimed that the remarks were
unintentional; the court, noting the presence of retired military personnel on the jury,
found otherwise. See id.
90. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 419 So. 2d 634, 635 (Fla. 1982) ("Is it reasonable to
believe that [the white victim], under any circumstances ... would consent to sexual
intercourse with that (indicating)?"); People v. Abrams, 441 N.E.2d 352, 358 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1982) (prosecutor made reference to racial composition of group of men who were
gambling); Commonwealth v.Johnson, 361N.E.2d212, 219 (Mass. 1977) (prosecutor in
summation made repeated reference to fact that victim was white, defendant black, and
the scene of the crime a "project" with heavy black population).
91. See Reiss, supra note 52, at 1367.

1992]

PROSECUTOR/AL RACISM

1227

standard are ultimately unpersuasive. Evaluation of intent primarily
addresses overt references to race. Unfortunately, many comments
likely to rouse jury prejudice are more subtle. In a trenchant analysis,
Professor Charles Lawrence III lamented the fact that courts "think of
facially neutral actions as either intentionally and unconstitutionally or
unintentionally and constitutionally discriminatory." 92 He observed
that requiring proof of conscious motivation in the realm of race ignores the way people's minds work. 93 Insofar as an exclusively intentbased regime overlooks subtle and unintended prosecutorial injections
ofracism, 94 it may fail to identify encroachments on a defenqant's longestablished right to an impartial jury.

B. Weight-of Evidence Analysis
An evidence-oriented approach focuses on the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury. Irrespective of prosecutorial intent,
courts employing this kind of analysis find racism in comments made by
the prosecutor that have a readily inferrable prejudicial effect on jurors.
Ascertaining the influence of a particular line of argument or epithet on
a jury thus becomes the pivotal question in the weight-of-evidence
cases.
Determining the effect on the jury of a prosecutor's comment relies on an inquiry into the comment's flagrance and, frequently, on the
net result of harmless error analysis. Notwithstanding a large body of
evidence against the defendant, some courts will find a comment impermissible because it might taint the jury's deliberation in ways even
the jurors themselves cannot ascertain. 95 Most other courts, however,
consistently seem to premise the evaluation of racism on the strength
of the prosecutor's evidence. When the case against the defendant is
not strong, most courts will presume that the racial comments influenced the jury. 96 When evidence to convict is substantial, many courts
92. Lawrence, supra note 13, at 322 (arguing against intent analysis for equal
protection challenges to statutes).
93. See id. at 323.
94. As the court in McFarland v. Smith, 61 l F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1979), recognized,
"[e]ven a reference that is not derogatory may carry impermissible connotations, or may
trigger prejudiced responses in the listeners that the speaker might neither have
predicted nor intended." Id. at 417.
95. See, e.g., Millerv. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (argument
that white woman would never consent to sexual relations with black man
"unquestionably prejudicial"); Kelly v. Stone, 514 F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975) (comment
that "maybe the next time it won't be a little black girl from the other side of the tracks"
contributed to denying defendant a fair trial); United States v. Haynes, 466 F.2d 1260,
1265-66 (5th Cir. 1972) (prosecutor's injection of racial shibboleth, "[b]urn, baby,
burn," may have had substantial influence on the jury). See generally DeBrota, supra
note 9 (arguing that even when substantial evidence may exist to convict defendant,
prosecutorial racism mandates automatic reversal).
96. See United States v. Grey, 422 F.2d 1043, 1045 (6th Cir. 1970) (because
evidence alone was insufficient to convict defendant, "white go-go dancer" question
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are willing to overlook-much as the Fifth Circuit in Russell 9 7 did- the
possible racist tenor of a comment. 98
The attempt to discern the effects of racial references on a jury
suffers from the inherent difficulty of identifying prejudice. 99 Courts
have long adhered to the idea that a white jury can be presumed impartial when minority defendants are on trial. 100 When the prosecutor
evokes prejudice, courts actively struggle with its implications in light
of that presumption. Lacking any obvious standard to measure the effect of prosecutorially inspired jury prejudice on the outcome of the
trial, 101 courts have created a variety of tests aimed at assessing the
strength of the prosecutor's case.
In cases in which the comments are racially charged but not egregious, many courts, rather than attempting to gauge the effect of the
comment on the jury in vacuo, seem to employ something analytically
akin to harmless error analysis. 102 The results of their evidentiary inquiry are used to determine not whether to afford a remedy, but instead
whether to deem a "harmless" remark not racist. In part, this approach
may be motivated by confusion about how to treat appeals to racial
prejudice. Because of the substantial costs inhering in the reversal of
convictions, 103 and because courts seem disinclined to decide that a
single racist comment may taint the whole trial, 104 courts tend to examine the full record and conclude that no violation has occurred.
must have had influence on jury); Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 546 (D.NJ. 1985)
(intimation that racial revenge was a motive was clearly prejudicial in light of dearth of
corroborating evidence).
97. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Burks, 508 F.2d 672, 673 (5th Cir. 1975) (reference
to race had no prejudicial effect when evidence of guilt was overwhelming); State v.
Scruggs, 421 N.W.2d 707, 716 (Minn. 1988) (court must evaluate weight of other
evidence in determining prejudicial impact of comment).
99. See Note, Forensic Misconduct, supra note 14, at 967.
100. See, e.g., Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 589 (1976) (refusing to grant defense
counsel the right to question jurors on their specific racial prejudices absent compelling
special circumstances). Only in the context of capital case sentencing by an all-white
jury has the Supreme Court acknowledged that jurors may be influenced by their own
biases. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986).
101. See Michael A. Jeter, Case Note, Criminal Law-The Right to an Impartial
Trial is Protected by an Opportunity to Prove that Juror Bias or Prosecutorial
Misconduct Affected the Outcome of the Trial, 26 How. LJ. 799, 803 (1983) ("[T]he
goal of determining the juror's partiality or impartiality [is] utterly incapable of proof.").
102. See cases cited supra note 96. Courts employing weight-of-evidence analysis
do tend to classify egregious slurs as violations of the rule proscribing prosecutorial
racism.
103. See Fisher, supra note 37, at 1301. The author acknowledges that a reversal
requires jurors, witnesses, courts and prosecutors to spend time, energy, and other
resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place. See id. Recognition of
these facts, however, should not preclude courts from identifying violations of the
proscription of prosecutorial racism.
104. See generally DeBrota, supra note 9 (arguing that racially prejudiced appeals
to the jury should mandate automatic reversal).
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As one commentator observed, this approach tends to move the
emphasis from the fairness of the proceeding to the guilt of the defendant.105 The approach relies on the notion that an improper racial reference does not taint the conviction-cannot improperly rouse the
prejudices of the jury-when the evidence is otherwise strong.
Whether the conviction is upheld, however, should be a different inquiry from whether the prosecutor has compromised jury impartiality .106 By ignoring the possibility that the jury was incited to prejudice
by the prosecutor and concentrating instead on the probable effect of
these messages on the jury's ultimate decision, many courts perpetrate
the violation of logic recognized in Snyder v. Massachusetts 107-they
"beg the constitutional question." 108
Moreover, an appellate court cannot easily measure the effect of a
given comment on the jury. Several commentators have remarked that
the reviewing court, in examining the record, misses many factors that
may bear on the ability of a comment to sway a jury. 109 The trial transcript reflects every word. It cannot convey tone, a sense of timing, or
juror reaction.
Finally, the idea that an identical comment or reference by the
prosecutor may be viewed as unduly racist in one trial and innocuous in
another, depending on the strength of the prosecutor's case, poses
grave implications for due process analysis. If flagrant racist comments
are made in open-and-shut cases, "criminal proceedings lose their appearance of fairness." 110 Under these circumstances, courts can "further embed the already too deep impression in public consciousness
that there are two standards of justice in the United States." 111 Because the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that prosecutions
in state courts be free of racially prejudicial arguments, 112 such a
double standard runs afoul of the Constitution.

C. Relevance-Based Scrutiny
The third approach courts employ m identifying racism distin105. See Fisher, supra note 37, at 1321.
106. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
107. 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 136. As Justice Roberts observed, courts should not "convert the
inquiry from one as to the denial of the right into one as to the prejudice suffered by the
denial. To pivot affirmance on the question of the amount of harm done the accused, is
to beg the constitutional question involved." Id. See also Note, Prosecutor
Indiscretion: A Result of Political Influence, 34 Ind. LJ. 477, 486 (1959) (courts send
message that "if one is obviously guilty as charged, [one) has no fundamental right to be
tried fairly").
109. See Singer, supra note 52, at 233; Note, Forensic Misconduct, supra note 14,
at 962.
110. Fisher, supra note 37, at 1321.
111. United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481F.2d152, 157 (2d Cir. 1973).
112. See id. at 159; Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978).
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guishes between comments implicating race that are relevant and irrelevant to the prosecution's case-in-chief. Courts using this approach
often evaluate whether a remark's probative value outweighs its potential prejudicial effect. Recognizing the risks inhering in racial arguments, these courts purport to decry all references to race unless they
are offered for a "race-neutral" purpose. 113
The relevancy approach derives analytic support from Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 ("Rule 403"), 114 which provides that,
[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 115
Although the rule applies primarily to evidence rather than to argument, the Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Brown 116 that references to the defendant as a man who "sells to little black children" and
who demeans white people as "white bitches" are within the purview of
Rule 403. 117
Courts have not been consistent in applying the concepts of probative value and unfair prejudice in the context of racial remarks by the
prosecutor. While flagrant references to race are universally disparaged by modern appellate courts, 118 many courts have carved out a
113. See, e.g., McFarland v. Smith, 61 l F.2d 414, 417 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[A]ny
reference to [race] by a prosecutor must be justified by a compelling state interest[.]");
State v. Jenkins, 340 So. 2d 157, 178 (La. 1976) (race may be a valid method of
identification); State v. Mitchell, 620 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Mo. 1981) (prosecutor's
statement that "he's not like us" was a justifiable comment on defendant's prior record);
State v. Granberry, 530 S.W.2d 714, 727 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (prosecutor may refer to
race as means of identification); State v. Henderson, No. 89 CA 96, 1990 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5183, at *8 (Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1990) (comment admissible when its content is
apparent to the jury); State v. Lee, 631 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)
(prosecutor can make reference to race in appropriate response to insinuations of
defense counsel).
114. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Louisiana has codified in its criminal code an approach
similar to that of the federal rule in this context. This standard, however, does not
mandate balancing of relevance and potential for prejudice, because it expressly applies
only when the comment is immaterial or irrelevant. It reads:
Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or
comment, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or
a court official, during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to:
(I) Race, religion, color or national origin, if the remark or comment is
not material and relevant and might create prejudice against the defendant
in the mind of the jury ....
La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 770(1) (West 1981).
115. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
116. 720 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983).
117. Id. at 1069.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reference to
Jamaicans taking over drug market impermissible); People v. Lurry, 395 N.E.2d 1234,
1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (insinuation that acquittal would encourage "these people" to
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generous array of exceptions to the relevancy rule that, in their broad
scope, may give prosecutors wide latitude in playing on the racial biases
of the jury .1 19 As one court allowed, " [w]here the color or race of the
parties has a factual bearing on the issues, a reference thereto comes
within the range of legitimate argument." 120 Problems arise when
"factually relevant" references threaten to swallow the general rule.
Most courts have sought to find "factual relevance" when the comment is subtle or seemingly innocuous in its reference to race. Courts
have countenanced racial references when made for the purpose of
identification; 121 when references are "merely descriptive"; 122 when
the prosecution asserts a racial motive to the crime that has a basis in
other evidence; 123 when made for purposes of impeachment; 124 and
when references are offered to refute arguments of defense counsel. 125
When the prosecution's alleged reference to race is oblique-an assertion, for example, that the defendant "is not like us" 126-courts manifest even greater unwillingness to brand the comment racist. 127
commit even more crimes of violence deemed prejudicial); Dawson v. State, 734 P.2d
221, 223 (Nev. 1987) (reference to defendant's "preference for white women"
improper).
119. The most problematic cases treat vague references to race as if they possess
no potential for prejudice. Despite repeated language to the effect that references to
race are admissible only if they have factual bearing on the case, these courts seem not
to engage in balancing when the comments are facially innocuous and have no
application to the evidence. See, e.g., People v. Montague, 500 N.E.2d 592, 599-600
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (reference to witness from a certain part of town permissible); State
v. Greene, 542 So. 2d 156, 157-58 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (prosecutor's reference to victim
as "nice white lady" permissible); State v. Noel, 693 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (statistics on percentage of murders committed by blacks not prejudicial). For
discussion of vague references to race, see supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
120. State v. Jackson, 83 S.W.2d 87, 94 (Mo. 1935).
121. See Turner v. State, 429 So. 2d 645, 647 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); Patterson v.
Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); State v.Jenkins, 340 So. 2d
157, 178 (La. 1976).
122. State v. Taggert, 443 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo. 1969); see also Noel, 693 S.W.2d
at 319 (because victim's and defendant's race were known to jurors, the argument did
not inject race into the trial).
123. See Dennis v. State, No. Bl4-88-0101 l-CR, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS 110, at *5
(Ct. App.Jan. 18, 1990). But see Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 540-41 (D.NJ.
1985) (when no evidentiary support existed, prosecutor's suggestion of racial revenge as
motive was impermissibly racist).
124. See, e.g., State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401, 408-09 (Ohio 1986) (prosecutor
fairly sought to rebut defendant's assertion that he was a devout Moslem).
125. See, e.g., State v. Greene, 542 So. 2d 156, 158 (La. Ct. App. 1989)
(prosecutor's remarks about victim's race only a recapitulation of witness' testimony);
State v. Lee, 631 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (prosecutor's remarks were
made in objection to defense argument).
126. State v. Mitchell, 620 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Mo. 1981).
127. See State v. Henderson, No. 89 CA 96, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5183, at *9-10
(Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1990) (comment that black defendant from a certain area "logically
had access to crack cocaine" was not error when jury knew race of defendant and area in
which he lived).
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Although the relevancy inquiry provides a useful conceptual basis
for understanding and classifying references to race, the liberal exceptions made in its implementation undermine its clarity and practical effects. While a few courts have deemed any racial reference a
constitutional violation "unless the remarks are abundantly justified," 128 many courts in fact do not conclude that a racial comment is
prejudicial when the comment is not clearly relevant or probative. 129
Accordingly, the approach courts employing a relevancy inquiry commonly take is to deem a comment prejudicial only if-irrespective of
relevance or prejudicial potential-it does not fit within very broadly
framed exceptions.

III.

A Two-PRONGED APPROACH To PRosECUTORIAL RACISM

For a variety of reasons, the standards used by most courts in determining whether a comment is racist have fallen short of fulfilling the
mandate of the Sixth Amendment. The approaches to identifying
prosecutorial racism employed by courts have largely ignored the trend
of modern racism, 130 and have instead generated a ban on an unabashed type of racism that has become increasingly anachronistic.
The intent-based inquiry suffers from imprecision. By focusing on the
willfulness of a prosecutor's remark, this approach fails to consider the
more latent racism that may permeate a prosecutor's oratory. 131 The
evidence-weighted approach can result in inconsistent standards and
the injection of flagrant racism into a trial when the evidence against
the defendant is incontrovertible. 132 The relevance inquiry shows
promise, but examination of its use reveals that concepts of relevancy
are more often than not breached in its implementation. 133
The very existence of such diverse standards presents significant
problems that suggest the desirability of a single systematic reformulation. The deficiencies of each approach, moreover, dictate that any new
approach must transcend the mere adoption of one standard from
among the several. Each of the enumerated approaches occasionally
identifies the most outrageous forms of racism-the gross stereotyping
against which most Americans have been schooled. 134 Each approach
128. McFarland v. Smith, 611F.2d414, 416-17 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Miller v.
North Carolina, 583 F.2d 70 l, 706 (4th Cir. 1978) (when evidence is relevant and
prejudicial, the law requires a demonstration that relevance and probative value exceed
collateral prejudicial effect).
129. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
13 l. See supra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 113-129 and accompanying text.
134. For statistics demonstrating marked change in racial attitudes of white
Americans before and after the Civil Rights Movement, see Pettigrew, supra note 67, at
687-88.
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proves glaringly inadequate, however, in addressing the manifestations
of indirect racism.
In large part, the acceptance of oblique racism reflects problems of
detection. 135 Manageable standards that can encompass subtle appeals
to racism have eluded courts. Consequently, courts have prohibited
only those comments by prosecutors that they can immediately recognize as racially charged. Bright-line rules possess immeasurable appeal
to courts in the context of prosecutorial racism, because easily obtained
reversals can undermine the integrity of the American criminal justice
system. Thus, the creation of an approach for identifying prosecutorial
racism must proceed mindful that any test requires clear standards and
relative ease in administration.
The test proposed in this section is two-pronged. The two kinds of
comment voiced in the Russell case 136 present different analytical
problems, and thus require distinct methods of detection. An explicit
reference, ostensibly innocuous, can at least be recognized immediately
as a racial reference. A test to address such references need focus only
on evaluating its potential prejudicial effects. The comment that implicitly refers to race, by contrast, as when the prosecutor characterizes a
witness as "shucking and jiving on the stand," 137 must first be recognized as a racial reference. Courts thus need to link the comment to the
defendant's race or ethnicity before proceeding to evaluate its prejudicial content. 138
A. An Approach to Explicit References to Race
Remarks referring directly to race can be divided into three categories: blatant slurs; gratuitous and ostensibly non-prejudicial references;
and comments serving a probative function. Almost all courts today
bar flagrantly racist remarks 139 and allow the probative comment. 140
Gratuitous references, in which considerations of race appear for no
perceptibly racist purpose, however, have posed significant problems
for analysis. 141
135. "[B]ecause the unconscious ... influences selective perceptions, whites are
unlikely to hear many of the inadvertent racial slights that are made daily in their
presence." Lawrence, supra note 13, at 340-41.
136. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
137. Smith v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (Ind. 1987).
138. A comment with prejudicial content or effect, of course, constitutes a violation
of the ban on prosecutorial racism. Identification of such a comment necessitates an
inquiry into remedies, which is not the focus of this Note.
139. See supra notes 87, 102, and 118 and accompanying text. The exception, of
course, is courts adhering to a strict weight-of-evidence approach. See supra notes
105-108 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 62-66, 121-127 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348, 1352-54 (8th Cir. 1974)
(court declined to brand comment about a "tree full of blackbirds" racist); People v.
Thomas, 561 N.E.2d 57, 80 (Ill. 1990) (comment that defendant habitually preys on
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Although gratuitous comments do not patently appeal to racism,
they possess no less potential for arousing prejudice than do more obvious remarks. These seemingly innocuous references to race may
serve to draw a line separating racial groups in American society. By
creating a "we" and a "they," 142 the prosecutor can induce jurors to
decide the case based upon stereotyped beliefs about other racial
groups. 143 Because "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness," 144 this kind of reference merits serious scrutiny.
Excising prosecutorial comments about the defendant's and victim's races when they serve no neutral purpose would eliminate much
opportunity for racial prejudice in a trial. Because of the difficulty of
identifying the effects of racial comments on the jury, the neutral/nonneutral purpose distinction may present the only manageable bright
line. An approach to drawing this line stems from two analogous contexts: evidentiary standards and the use of peremptory challenges
against minority jurors.
l. A New Evidentiary Rationale. - The first basis for excluding nonneutral comments is a modified version of the relevancy-based scrutiny
many courts already employ. 145 Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 146
402, 14 7 and 403 148 provide a useful framework for the discussion of
prosecutorial racism. Rule 40 l establishes that all relevant evidence is
admissible in trial. Irrelevant evidence, evidence that does not tend to
young white women" had no effect on defendant's substantive rights); State v.
Granberry, 530 S.W.2d 714, 726-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (repeated references to
defendant's race not derogatory).
142. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 160 (2d
Cir. 1973) (court observed that reference to people of color as a group had "the natural
concomitant that the defendants would be viewed by the jury members as coming from a
distinct, a different community from themselves").
143. See Lawrence, supra note 13, at 339. One commentator has labelled the
inability to perceive racism in ostensibly race-neutral comments "conceptual racism."
See Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 581, 599 (1977).
144. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); accord McKendrick, 481 F.2d at
159.
145. See supra notes 113-129 and accompanying text.
146. Fed. R. Evid. 401. The text of this rule reads: "'Relevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." Id.
147. Fed. R. Evid. 402. This rule sets forth the ground rules for admissibility of all
evidence: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible." Id.
148. Fed. R. Evid. 403. For the text of rule 403, see supra note 115 and
accompanying text.
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establish a material proposition, 149 is per se inadmissible under Rule
402. Rule 403 qualifies the admissibility of relevant evidence, mandating exclusion if the potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the possible probative effect of the evidence. According to the
Federal Rules' Advisory Committee, "unfair prejudice" in this context
means "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." 150 Unfair prejudice may adversely affect the jury's attitude toward the defendant irrespective of the issue of guilt or innocence. 15 1
The appeal to racial bias coincides with Rule 403's definition of
unfair prejudice. While analogy to the federal rules may appear inapposite insofar as they regulate the admission of evidence-not remarks
made by lawyers-the rules provide a useful approach to categorizing
racial remarks by their prejudicial effect. Under Rule 403's formulation, the flagrant racial slur would most likely be inadmissible. The
mention of race for a probative purpose would be permissible only if,
pursuant to the balancing approach, its potential probative effect substantially outweighed any collateral appeal to emotion. Furthermore,
the gratuitous reference, which by definition adds nothing to the trial,
would be inadmissible under Rule 402.
Many courts already employ an approach to identifying racism that
adheres facially to the presumption that references to race have a prejudicial impact. 152 More often than not, however, these courts fit the gratuitous reference to race within a generously defined exception. 153 As
a result, courts using this approach send the message that a seemingly
harmless racial comment either has some merit beyond its prejudicial
consequences or has no prejudicial potential at all.
When analyzed according to the evidentiary standards, the approach of these courts is untenable. The gratuitous comment not only
strains "relevance," but also possesses a capacity for prejudice that
undoubtedly exceeds any possible probative value a court could
ascribe. 154 Since racism remains a significant danger and Americans
149. See Anthony J. Bocchino & David A. Sonenshein, A Practical Guide to Federal
Evidence 29-30 (1988).
150. Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note.
151. See United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, Ill! & n.2 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 244 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Figueroa,
618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980).
152. See cases cited supra note 113.
153. See supra notes 118-129 and accompanying text. But see United States v.
Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 25, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's comments about Jamaicans
and repeated use of "they" created substantial probability of prejudice mandating
reversal); Kelly v. Stone, 514 F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975) (comment that "maybe the next
time it won't be a little black girl from the other side of the tracks; maybe it will be
somebody that you know" constituted appeal to examine prejudice over evidence);
Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 545 (D.N.J. 1985) (when evidence is relevant and
prejudicial, probative value must demonstrably outweigh prejudicial effect).
154. See, e.g., Dawson v. State, 734 P.2d 221, 223 (Nev. 1987) ("Does a black
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live in what one commentator described as "an era of racially supercharged criminal trials," 155 courts must recognize the prejudicial potential of the facially inoffensive comment. 156
2. The Peremptory Challenge Analogue. - Support for the classification of facially neutral references to race as impermissible also emerges
from the line of cases dealing with peremptory challenges. 157 Additionally, these cases provide a procedural approach to identifying the
gratuitous reference that should effectively serve in the context of
prosecutorial racism.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 158 the Supreme Court revised the evidentiary
burden on defendants attempting to prove improper exclusion of jurors on racial grounds. 159 After displacing the onerous Swain standard, 160 the Court set up what amounts to a three-part test for gauging
whether impermissible factors influenced the prosecutor's decision to
excuse a JUror.
According to the Batson standard, a defendant must establish a
prima facie showing that the prosecutor employed peremptory challenges against members of the defendant's racial or ethnic group.1 61
This showing raises an inference that the prosecutor decided to use the
man's supposed sexual preference [for white women] have anything at all to do with
whether he deserves to die for his deeds?").
155. James R. Acker, Exercising Peremptory Challenges After Batson, 24 Crim. L.
Bull. 187, 196 (1988).
156. The inquiry will be different depending on whether the jurisdiction has
adopted harmless or fundamental error analysis. For cases analyzing racial appeals to
the jury pursuant to fundamental error analysis, see Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d
701, 708 (4th Cir. 1978) ("prejudice engendered is so great that automatic reversal is
required"); United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 161 (2d Cir.
1973) (suggesting that these cases should be viewed as an exception to the Chapman
harmless error rule).
157. The first case in this line, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), held
that the purposeful exclusion of black jurors from the venire violated the defendant's
right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court found that the purposeful or deliberate
exclusion of blacks from the petit jury violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at
203-04. In devising a test to combat impermissible exclusions, the Court in Swain
carefully retained the traditional latitude afforded both sides in peremptory challenges.
The result was an evidentiary hurdle described by a later Court as "a crippling burden of
proof." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986). Under Swain, defendants had to
prove that the prosecutor had engaged in systematic exclusion of minority jurors over a
number of cases. Difficulties with this burden of proof are evinced by the Batson court's
comment that "peremptory challenges are now largely immune from constitutional
scrutiny." Id. at 92-93.
158. 476 U.S. 79.
159. See Id.
160. Swain, 380 U.S. 202.
161. Although the Batson Court discusses the requirement that the prosecutor's
strikes be intentional, the Court allows an inference of intent to follow from disparate
impact. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
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challenge in a race-based manner. 162 Upon the defendant's satisfaction
of this burden, the onus shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a raceneutral explanation for challenging the minority jurors. 163 The trial
judge then evaluates this rationale in light of the defendant's
assertion. 164
While ostensibly emphasizing the willfulness of the prosecutor, the
Batson court disavowed exclusive focus on intent, noting that the prosecutor could not rebut a prima facie case by merely denying a discriminatory motive. 165 The Batson standard requires that race play no part
in the prosecutor's decision to dismiss prospective jurors. The excuse
of arbitrary challenges or no excuse at all will not suffice when the defendant has made a prima facie showing; the prosecutor's explanation
must be credible and race-neutral. 166 The Court in Batson presumed
that any race-dependent decision, even if seemingly innocuous, violates
the defendant's constitutional rights. 167
The Batson approach informs the inquiry into improper
prosecutorial appeals to the jury. Specifically, the Court recognized the
danger inherent in any race-dependent rationale. Even the apparently
inoffensive prosecutorial excuse, if it bears any relationship to the defendant's race, would provoke reversal of the defendant's conviction.
This recognition-in conjunction with the Court's view that more subtly held racial attitudes can influence jurors 168-suggests that facially
harmless references to race, when they are unsupported by a race162. See id. at 96.
163. See id. at 97. The Court did not require that this neutral explanation rise to
the level of cause. Rather, it mandated that the prosecutor provide a "'clear and
reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the
challenges." Id. at 98 n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).
164. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 at 98.
165. See id. To allow such an argument, the Court found, would render the Equal
Protection clause a "vain and illusory requirement." Id. (citation omitted).
166. See id. at 97-98. One state court applying its post-Batson version of the test
held as follows:
[I] t is not sufficient that a prosecutor's explanations, in meeting the
presumption that the peremptory challenge is being abused, are facially raceneutral. The trial court must further evaluate the proffered explanations in
light of the standards we recognize here, other circumstances of the case, and
the judges' knowledge of trial tactics in order to make a reasoned
determination that the prosecutor's facially innocuous explanations are not
contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.
Slappy v. State, 503 So. 2d 350, 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
167. As one commentator surmised, "[h]arm is either conclusively presumed to
flow from the exercise of peremptories based on improper intent, or is not an element of
the constitutional violation at all." Reiss, supra note 52, at 1418-19.
168. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986). This reference was to
psychological factors that play on a jury's decision to sentence a defendant to the death
penalty.
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neutral rationale, should be recognized as violations of the ban on
prosecutorial racism.
3. Synthesis: Developing a Test. - When a prosecutor mentions race
for a probative purpose that outweighs the potential for prejudice, the
comment manifestly is appropriate for inclusion at trial. 169 Proper references to race include, but are not limited to, those made for the purpose of identification, I 70 those alleging racial motive when ample
evidence corroborates the inference, 171 and those responding to a racial argument advanced by defense counsel. 172 Any further exceptions
should be adjudged according to a compelling state interest standard, 173 under which only those comments vital to advancing an important interest of the state are appropriate at trial. 174
An approach to winnowing out gratuitous prosecutorial references
to race from trials can profitably proceed along the lines of the Batson
test. 175 When the defendant establishes that the prosecutor has made a
gratuitous reference to race, the burden should shift to the prosecutor
to articulate a probative rationale. If the court finds the comment relevant and "abundantly justified" 176 in light of the evidence, the inquiry
will cease. If the court finds the prosecutor's explanation unsatisfactory, it may consider prospects for admonishing the prosecutor, declaring a mistrial or, on appellate review, reversing the conviction.1 77
169. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("unembellished reference to evidence of race" allowable when it refers to the evidence
and not to emotion); McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 417 (2d Cir. 1979) (references
to race are permissible when they serve a "compelling state interest"); Carter v. Rafferty,
621 F. Supp. 533, 545 (D.NJ. 1985) (same); State v. Granberry, 530 S.W.2d 714, 726
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (when reference has a factual bearing on the issues, the reference
" 'comes within the range of legitimate argument' ") (quoting State v. Jackson, 83
S.W.2d 87, 94 (Mo. 1935)).
170. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 429 So. 2d 645, 647 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982);
Patterson v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Greene, 542
So. 2d 156, 158 (La. Ct. App. 1989). The identification exception should not be
construed as the basis for including gratuitous emphasis of the defendant's race.
171. See Dennis v. State, No. B 14-88-0 I 0 I I-CR, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS 110, at *5
(Ct. App. Jan. 18, 1990) ("[P]rosecutor had the right to draw from the evidence all
reasonable inferences."). The suggestion that racial revenge was a motive was deemed
unacceptable when a scant amount of evidence supported the theory in Carter, 621 F.
Supp. 533.
172. This exception, however, should be circumscribed so as not to afford the
prosecutor excessive latitude once the defense counsel has "opened the door." See Doe,
903 F.2d at 27.
173. See McFarland, 611 F.2d at 417 ("[G]iven the general requirement that the
race of a criminal defendant must not be the basis of any adverse inference, any
reference to it by a prosecutor must be justified by a compelling state interest.").
174. References like those made in the cases cited supra at note 119 would not
qualify under this formulation.
175. Louisiana has codified into its criminal code a similar approach to identifying
racism. See supra note 114.
176. McFarland,611 F.2dat417.
177. This second step will vary with a jurisdiction's adoption of harmless or
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Irrespective of remedy, courts will have performed an important function even in identifying the violation.

B. The Indirect Reference to Race
The standard barring references to race except when they are submitted for race-neutral purposes cannot adequately deal with the problem of the oblique reference. The clarity and consistency of that
standard depend on the fact that everyone is able to recognize words
such as "black," "colored," "Mexican," and "white" as racial terms.
When the prosecutor probes collective culture and uses a term replete
with racial connotations but without explicit racial tenor, prospects for
delineating the lines of improper argument become more difficult.
The case law reveals extraordinary variety among comments alleged by defendants to constitute impermissible references to race. 178
Although not every metaphor uttered by a prosecutor lends itself to
interpretation along racial lines, some comments so correspond with
racial stereotypes, images, and watchwords pervading American culture
that a reasonable listener could not fail to deem them racially charged.
The Fifth Circuit recognized this in United States v. Haynes, 179 in which it
found impermissible racial undertones in the prosecutor's comment,
"[b]urn, baby, burn." 180 Even though race was never expressly mentioned, the court held that "[t]he impropriety of government counsel's
interjection of this racial shibboleth is too obvious to require
comment." 181
Professor Charles Lawrence III has proposed a method of identifying racially discriminatory statutes that encapsulates the approach used
by the Haynes court for prosecutorial appeals to racism. 182 Arguing
that the preponderance of subtle racism thwarts intent analysis,
Lawrence submitted a "cultural meaning test," by which government
conduct should be evaluated "to see if it conveys a symbolic message to
which the culture attaches racial significance." 183 Adapted to
fundamental error analysis for prosecutorial invocations of race. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., People v. Duncan, 810 P.2d 131, 142 (Cal. 1991) (en bane)
(defendant is like "a Bengal tiger in its natural habitat"); People v. Montague, 500
N.E.2d 592, 599 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) ("The State must take their witnesses where they
find them . . . . Crimes on the east side . . . generally have witnesses from the east
side."); State v. Scruggs, 421 N.W.2d 707, 715 (Minn. 1988) ("remember the one-eyed
jack [of spades]"); State v. Mitchell, 620 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Mo. 1981) (en bane) ("[H]e
... is not like us."); State v. Henderson, No. 89 CA 96, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5183, at
*8 (Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1990) (defendant "logically had access to crack cocaine"). In
none of these cases did courts find that the contested comments were racist.
179. 466 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1972).
180. Id. at 1265.
181. Id. at 1266.
182. See Lawrence, supra note 13, at 355-58.
183. Id. at 356.
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prosecutorial forensics, this test can become a reasonable person
standard. 184
As used in the context of prosecutorial forensics, a reasonable person standard should be confined to one articulable purpose: determining whether the comment has racial (not racist) undertones.
Reasonable person analysis thus would require no more of the reviewing court than that it be sensitive to racial implications in prosecutorial
argument. As one commentator noted, the Supreme Court in Batson
manifested confidence in the trial judge's ability to discern racial tenor
in a peremptory challenge, despite the facial neutrality of a prosecutor's
rationale. 185
The reasonable person standard would serve to translate the oblique reference so as to allow analysis similar to that used for direct
references to race. 186 Once a court deems a comment racially charged,
the analysis should revert to a Batson-relevancy inquiry and, if need be,
a balancing of probative value against potential prejudicial impact.
C. The Russell Case Revisited
The two comments from James Russell's trial1 87 can be used to
demonstrate this two-pronged test in action. Analysis of these comments also demonstrates that the suggested approach incorporates a
broader definition of racism without sacrificing the need for clearly delineated lines of judicial review. 188
In referring to "three blacks," the county prosecutor directly invoked race. This comment therefore requires primary application of
the relevancy inquiry. The prosecutor's question of the jury, "[c]an you
imagine the fear of [the victim] ... out with three blacks," 189 manifested
no propensity, subtle or acknowledged, to serve a probative purpose.
The full comment appears to have been designed to elicit juror sympathy for the victim's apparent terror in the minutes preceding his death.
As such, the mention of the defendant's race stands within the context
of an emotional appeal. Whether the reference to "three blacks" was
184. Obviously, a test devised to gauge subtle racism cannot be all-encompassing.
Indirect references to race cannot always be discerned. The reviewing judge, no matter
how vigilant or sensitive, will miss many racially charged comments because they are
difficult to detect. As the Supreme Court observed at the beginning of this century,
"[b]ias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not
impossible, to always recognize its existence .... " Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S.
183, 196 (1909).
185. See Acker, supra note 155, at 188.
186. See supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
188. Specifically, analysis of the two comments pursuant to the suggested approach
reveals that they should have been considered violations of the rule proscribing
prosecutorial racism. The Fifth Circuit, reviewing the two comments, found one of
them merely "regrettable." See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
189. Petition, supra note I, at 18 (emphasis added).
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inadvertent or deliberate, it reverberated in an argument in which its
potential for prejudice loomed large.
The relevancy inquiry-in presupposing an undiscernible tendency to incite racism in the gratuitous reference to race at trial-militates in favor of branding these comments violations of the rule
proscribing prosecutorial racism. That the ultimate effect on the jury
cannot precisely be gauged is of no consequence, for "our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." 190
Accordingly, the relevance standard operates in the realm of probabilities of prejudice. Given that a racial remark may induce the jury to emphasize emotion over evidence, its use must be circumscribed by its
relative probative value. In the obvious lack of probative content in the
prosecutor's comment, a court applying the relevancy approach would
find a violation of the ban on prosecutorial racism.
The prosecutor's second comment, referring to the "civil rights of
the defendant," made no direct invocation of race. According to the
reasonable person test, one should look to the implications of the comment in deciding whether it represents an image that American society
imbues with racial significance. In the past thirty years, the term "civil
rights," like the raised-fist gesture or the phrase "we shall overcome,"
has become inexorably linked to the quest by black Americans for social
and political equality. Thus, the prosecutor's appeal arguably employed "racial shibboleth[s]" 191 in its attempt to focus the jury on race
and to divert its sympathies from the defendant to the victim.
A reasonable person likely would draw no distinction between
"[b ]urn, baby, burn" 192 and this recourse to a term replete with racial
undertones. Accordingly, the comment merits analysis pursuant to the
relevancy-based inquiry. As with the "three blacks" comment, the
prosecutor's argument in which this reference played a part did not
represent an attempt to convince the jury by probative appeal. 193
Rather, it had great propensity to evoke the racial frustrations of the
all-white jury. 194
190. United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1973)
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
191. United States v. Haynes, 466 F.2d 1260, 1266 (5th Cir. 1972).
192. Id. at 1265.
193. Indeed, that the racially charged statements were made during the
prosecutor's final summation reinforces this observation.
194. Pettigrew characterizes this kind of frustration as a "micro-aggression." His
studies reveal that "a sense of subjective threat from racial change" and "opposition to
racial change for ostensibly nonracial reasons" are on the rise in American society.
Pettigrew, supra note 67, at 687. In light of the recent gubernatorial election in
Louisiana, in which white resentment against programs designed to assist blacks gained
prominence, Pettigrew's conclusion is not difficult to accept. See generally Robin
Toner, Racial Politics: Back with a Vengeance, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1991, at DI
(observing that racial issues are more prominent now than they have been in twenty
years).
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Taken together, the results of the inquiry into the racial content
and the potential for prejudice of the two comments suggest that the
courts should have acknowledged the potentially racist tenor of both
comments and proceeded to the remedy inquiry. By recognizing prejudice and condemning the prosecutor's conduct, the courts would have
taken a valuable stride towards ameliorating racial inequities in the
American criminal justice system. They would have established from
above both the validity of the defendant's complaint and the courts'
commitment to purging irrelevant racial remarks from criminal trials.
CONCLUSION

In the modern era of subtle racism, the analytical attempt to define
a comment as an appeal to prejudice suffers because no one is capable
of recognizing and reckoning with racism's every occurrence. Courts
struggle in their approach to less flagrant comments, mindful of the
need to bar racism at trial without losing grasp of all standards. A
method of inquiry in which references to race are presumptively prejudicial unless offered for a substantially probative purpose creates a judicially manageable bright-line, a means of identifying racism by
reference to familiar standards. In order to combat the public impression that there are two standards of justice in America, society must
realize that the approach to banning prosecutorial racism lies in desperate need of reevaluation. Only by consistently denouncing racist
comments made during trials will courts secure their integral role in
enforcing the mandates of the Constitution.
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